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Abstract
Many studies find a strong association between press freedom and corruption perceptions (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003;
Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Freille, Haque, & Kneller, 2007). However, it is possible that this relationship is driven by experts’
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and corruption perceptions using objective measures of corruption from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, a series of
representative surveys of the owners and topmanagers of private firms in themanufacturing and service sectors. Our find-
ings suggest that there is a reputational premium associated with press freedom: Holding corruption experiences constant,
corruption perceptions are improved by greater press freedom.Moreover, we find that the developed world is best placed
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1. Introduction
Many studies find that a free press improves percep-
tions of corruption, with most arguing that journalists
have clear incentives to uncover and report corruption
(Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003;
Freille, Haque, & Kneller, 2007). These studies acknowl-
edge two particular mechanisms. The first, taking inspi-
ration from Becker’s (1968) model of crime, is that a free
press should lower actual corruption levels by increasing
the expected costs of corruption for would-be criminals.
With would-be criminals facing higher costs, we should
observe and perceive less corruption in society, and pop-
ular corruption indicators—to the extent that they are
accurate—should reflect this reality. The second mecha-
nism is that corruption experts may use press freedom
as a mental shortcut, or heuristic device, when compil-
ing corruption perceptions indices. If experts do this rou-
tinely, then press freedom may improve corruption per-
ceptions irrespective of actual corruption levels.
While the literature acknowledges that both mech-
anisms are plausible, no study has tested empirically
the proposition that the second mechanism is a mean-
ingful driver of corruption perceptions. This is substan-
tively important because if the secondmechanism is driv-
ing outcomes, then some countries may enjoy a reputa-
tional premium, such that experts give them better as-
sessments than one might expect given the levels of ex-
perienced corruption. To test this conjecture, we exam-
ine the hypothesis that an improvement in press free-
dom is associated with an improvement in corruption
perceptions, while holding experienced corruption con-
stant. In order to measure experienced corruption, we
use the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, a series of rep-
resentative surveys of the owners and top managers of
private firms in the manufacturing and service sectors.
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Our findings suggest that there is a reputational pre-
mium: Holding corruption experiences constant, corrup-
tion perceptions are improved by greater press freedom.
Having found evidence for a reputational premium
on average, we then ask if it is available to all countries.
Our results show that low to moderately corrupt coun-
tries can see gains from improving press freedom. This
finding has important implications. First, it suggests that
in very corrupt countries a free press will not change
corruption perceptions unless it changes the reality of
corruption. Second, it suggests that developed countries
would see reputational gains from improved press free-
dom, as they tend to enjoy low tomoderate levels of cor-
ruption compared to other groups.
While press freedom is often considered the hall-
mark of a developed country, data from Reporters
Without Borders show that it is under threat in many
OECD countries. In Greece, for example, journalists
are frequently arrested under legislation—the ‘flagrant
procedure’—dealing with press crimes. In Poland, ac-
tions to nationalize themedia since 2015 havemade it in-
creasingly difficult for journalists to dissent from the gov-
ernment’s position without being subject to harassment
and prosecution. Even in Ireland, which is a relatively
clean country by global standards, media ownership is
highly concentrated and journalists are constrained by
strict libel laws. Furthermore, while many developed
countries such as these may have necessary anticorrup-
tion laws and policies, their effectiveness may depend
critically on press freedom. Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov
(2017), for example, show some of the most important
tools do not always work in isolation and require public
scrutiny, underlining the importance of press freedom.
The loss of reputation has real world consequences.
Many studies demonstrate that higher corruption per-
ceptions can harm national wellbeing by repelling for-
eign direct investment (Wei, 2000) and undermining im-
portant outcomes such as GDP growth (Mauro, 1995)
and interpersonal and institutional trust (Anderson &
Tverdova, 2003; Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan,
2015; Chang & Chu, 2006; Seligson, 2002). This latter ef-
fect on trust in the state and its agents can undermine
support for democracy, even in the developed world.
To limit reputational damage, policymakers should focus
considerable efforts and resources on protecting media
freedoms and implementing needed reforms.
In the next section, we discuss the literature on cor-
ruption and press freedom. Section 3 presents our data
andmethod. Section 4 presents anddiscusses our results.
In Section 5we concludewith a discussion of the substan-
tive importance and policy-relevance of our findings.
2. Press Freedom and Corruption: Literature
and Argument
There is a scholarly consensus that a free press has an
important role in the fight against corruption. Many em-
pirical studies demonstrate a strong link between vari-
ous indicators of corruption perceptions and press free-
dom. Brunetti and Weder’s (2003) seminal study finds
a strong correlation in a sample of 125 countries from
1994 to 1998, Adsera et al. (2003) detect a similar pat-
tern in two samples across multiple time periods, as
do Freille et al. (2007) using alternative estimation tech-
niques. Moreover, scholars have considered in detail the
role ofmoderating factors such as the level of democracy
level (Chowdhury, 2004; Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013),
and the level sociopolitical integration (Charron, 2009).
In virtually all tests, the association between press free-
dom and corruption holds, and is robust to a range of
controls and estimation techniques.
However, there are unanswered questions about
the substantive effect of press freedom on corruption
(Färdigh, Andersson, & Oscarsson, 2011). As we have
seen, the majority of existing studies support two partic-
ular mechanisms—the first where press freedom makes
criminal behavior costlier, reducing corrupt activity and
thus perceptions of corruption, and the second where
it simply changes experts’ perceptions of corruption, ir-
respective of actual corruption levels. A large literature
in corruption studies has questioned the accuracy of
experts’ perceptions, and other perception-based mea-
sures, arguing that they suffer from perception biases
(Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2009; Reinikka & Svensson, 2006;
Svensson, 2003; Treisman, 2007). Taking our motivation
from this literature, we argue that the experts who com-
pile national-level corruption indicators may associate
state control of the media with higher levels of corrup-
tion, irrespective of actual corruption levels, resulting in
a reputational premium.
Whether this premium exists depends on the extent
to which experts do this routinely. Yet, there are sev-
eral reasons why corruption experts may systematically
equate media freedoms with corruption. First, experts
may conflate a lack of press freedomwith a lack of trans-
parency and accountability in society. Corruption is more
likely in such environments and as a consequence, ex-
pert assessments may be stricter regardless of experi-
enced corruption. By contrast, where there is greater
transparency, experts may havemore confidence in their
own ability, or the ability of their sources, to detect cor-
ruption. Second, experts require information to make
judgements about corruption. Countries that lack press
freedom have limited the flow of information in society,
potentially raising uncertainty among experts about the
accuracy of their assessments. This may trigger cognitive
biases such as conservatism or negativity, leading to less
favorable assessments. Third, press freedommay simply
be amental shortcut or heuristic device for compiling cor-
ruption perceptions indices. Experts are aware of the ev-
idence linking press freedom to corruption and may use
this knowledge to rank countries, regardless of changes
in corruption experiences. While these possibilities are
not an exhaustive description of reasons why there may
be a reputational premium, they suggest that such a pre-
mium is plausible. Moreover, the factors that we have
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outlined, such as mental shortcuts and uncertainty have
been proven to play an important role in expert decision-
making in other domains such as investment decisions
(Mosley, 2003).
While a reputational premium is plausible, it does
not rule out a direct role for press freedom in the fight
against corruption. In fact, there is growing support for
a link between press freedom and alternative corrup-
tion outcomes. Flavin and Montgomery (2019), for ex-
ample, find that the gap between citizens’ perceptions
and experts’ assessments of corruption narrows con-
siderably at higher levels of press freedom, suggesting
that press freedom is essential in bringing corruption
to light. Binhadab, Breen, and Gillanders (2018) show
that greater press freedom is associated with a lower
incidence of corruption as reported by firms in World
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, establishing a link between
press freedom and a reduction in corrupt activity. Finally,
Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2017) show that key anti-
corruption tools require public scrutiny to be effective,
further underlining the importance of press freedom. In
summary, our argument regarding the possibility of a
reputational premium linked to press freedom is plau-
sible given what we know about the nature of interna-
tional corruption indicators, and at the same time it is
compatible with the existing evidence that there is a sub-
stantial direct link between press freedom and real cor-
ruption, and indeed anti-corruption outcomes.
The next logical question is whether the reputa-
tional premium hypothesis can be tested, given the chal-
lenges inherent in measuring corruption and the limita-
tions of corruption indicators such as the Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. To ad-
dress these concerns, researchers have developed new
strategies and techniques for measuring corruption.
First, field and lab experiments have become increas-
ingly popular, examining phenomena such as the link
between bribery and gender (Armantier & Boly, 2011)
and the degree of reciprocity between bribers and pub-
lic officials (Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2002). In con-
trast to the observational studies that focus on corrup-
tion perceptions, experimental research tends to focus
on corrupt transactions. Like other experimental work in
the social sciences, external validity is a perennial con-
cern and carefully designed observational studies can
complement and increase our confidence in their find-
ings. Second, several scholars argue that it is now pos-
sible to collect reliable micro-data on corrupt activities
from well-designed surveys (see for example Diaby &
Sylwester, 2015). According to Reinikka and Svensson
(2006, p. 365) reliable surveys should use indirect ques-
tions to encourage truthful responses and avoid incrim-
inating the respondent. Since the advent of this type
of survey technique in corruption research, there has
been a plethora of new studies exploring corrupt activi-
ties in different contexts, including bribery in Asian firms
(Wu, 2009), how the gender of top management affects
bribery (Breen, Gillanders, McNulty, & Suzuki, 2017),
how bribery affects firm growth (Fisman & Svensson,
2007), and how males and younger people are more
likely to pay bribes in sub-Saharan Africa (Justesen &
Bjørnskov, 2014). Finally, a new wave of corruption re-
search is developing new approaches using machine
learning techniques (Hlatshwayo et al., 2018) and novel
data, including public procurement data (Fazekas, Tóth,
& King, 2016) and audit results (Mondo, 2016).
We draw several lessons from the wider literature on
corruption measurement. The first is that there is no sin-
gle optimal approach tomeasuring corruption outcomes
and that each of the existing approaches have limitations
and advantages. The second is that advances in survey
design mean that we can now construct reliable mea-
sures of corruption experiences from sources such as the
World Bank’s Enterprise surveys. Thus, it is now possible
to test the relationship between corruption perceptions
and press freedomwhilst holding corruption experiences
constant. Moreover, it is possible to examine the circum-
stances under which the reputational premium may be
stronger or weaker. To do so, we estimate models which
incorporate measures of experienced and perceived lev-
els of corruption, as well as interaction terms between
press freedom and experienced-based measures of cor-
ruption. Our data, methods and findings are described in
the sections that follow.
3. Data and Method
We measure press freedom using Freedom House’s in-
dex. Freedom House create their index by combining ex-
pert assessments with analyses of newspapers, and gov-
ernment and non-government documents. One of the
advantages of this index is that it places an emphasis on
the implementation of press freedom, as well as taking
into consideration laws and practices. Implementation
matters: Though a free press may be enshrined in leg-
islation it may not be implemented in practice, underlin-
ing the need for broad measures that capture de facto
as well as de jure press freedom. The index ranges from
0 to 100 with larger numbers denoting less press free-
dom. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our key vari-
ables and Table 2 shows their correlations. In our sample,
Sweden in 2014 has themost press freedomwith a score
of 10. Uzbekistan in 2013 scored 95 and is the country
with the least press freedom in our sample. Despite the
advantages of Freedom House’s indicator, it may be sub-
ject to perception biases. As a robustness test, therefore,
we use an alternative metric of press freedom created
by Reporters Without Borders. This indicator is compiled
from surveys of experts and objective data on journalists’
experiences of abuse and violence. It ranges from 0 to
100, with zero being the best possible score. While nei-
ther press freedom indicator is perfect, our results hold
across both indicators and their differentmethodologies,
with one placing emphasis on implementation and the
other on journalists’ experiences of violence.
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Table 1. Data and summary statistics for main sample.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Scale Source
Corruption Perceptions Index 76 35.65 13.53 11 87 0–100 Transparency
International (2019)
Bribery Index 76 16.33 14.19 0 61.8 % Firms World Bank (2019a)
Obstacle 76 7.36 5.79 0 23.6 % Firms World Bank (2019a)
Press Freedom 76 54.44 19.51 10 95 0–100 Freedom House (2019)
Democracy 76 4.15 5.49 −9 10 −10 to 10 Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer,
& Walsh (2001)
Ln(GDP p.c.) 76 7.94 1.19 5.49 10.88 Log World Bank (2019b)
Ln(Openness) 76 −0.18 0.47 −1.49 0.75 Log World Bank (2019b)
To measure corruption perceptions, we use the
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with smaller
numbers denoting more corruption. The Corruption
Perceptions Index is an amalgamation of several surveys
of experts and senior business leaders. It is not correct
to compare values of the Corruption Perceptions Index
before 2012 due to the way in which the index was con-
structed before a change in methodology in 2012 and so
our sample covers 2012–2016. In a robustness exercise
we use the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index.
Unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index, this is a hybrid
indicator as some of its sources are based on individuals’
and firms’ experiences. Nevertheless, using this variable
significantly increases the number of observations.
We source our objective measures of corruption
from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. These repre-
sentative surveys of firms have been carried out in many
countries by a specialized unit within the World Bank
since the early years of themillennium. The respondents
are owners and top managers of private firms, with a fo-
cus on the manufacturing and service sectors. From the
resulting dataset, we draw on two variables to measure
the experienced level of corruption. The first is the per-
centage of public transactions in which a gift or informal
payment was requested. This is created from six survey
questions which ask respondents if ‘an informal gift or
payment expected or requested’ in the contexts of seek-
ing electrical or water connections, construction, import,
and operating licenses and permits, andmeetingwith tax
officials. Many of the same authors who have identified
concerns with regards to using perceptions of corruption
as a proxy for the reality of corruption have argued that
exercises like the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys can
provide reliable information on corruption (Knack, 2007;
Reinikka & Svensson, 2006; Svensson, 2005). In our main
sample, this bribery index ranges from 0% in Estonia and
Israel in 2013 to 61.8% in Cambodia in the same yearwith
amean of around 16%. Our secondmeasure—obstacle—
is the percentage of firms who identify corruption as the
biggest obstacle they face. Together, thesemeasures cap-
ture firms’ experiences of corruption, though the first
more directly measures firms’ broad experiences while
the second is useful because it addresses the extent to
which corruption matters in a hierarchy of challenges.
Mawejje and Sebudde (2019) have tested the validity of
the second measure in a study of Ugandan firms, find-
ing a negative correlation between obstacle and expec-
tations regarding future firm performance. Figure 1 illus-
trates the relationship between our key variables. The
top-left panel plots the simple correlation between the
Corruption Perceptions Index and press freedom, and
shows that more press freedom is associated with a
lower level of perceived corruption. The top-right panel
plots the objective measure of corruption—our bribery
index—against press freedom. In linewith Binhadab et al.
(2018), it suggests that more press freedom is associated
with less experienced corruption. The bottom panel of
Figure 1 plots perceptions of corruption against firms’
experiences of corruption and finds a moderate correla-
Table 2. Correlation matrix.
Bribery index Obstacle Press freedom Democracy Log GDP pc Log openness
Corruption Perceptions Index 1.00
Bribery Index −0.57 1.00
Obstacle −0.37 0.46 1.00
Press Freedom −0.72 0.36 0.09 1.00
Democracy 0.53 −0.20 0.06 −0.77 1.00
Log GDP pc 0.71 −0.56 −0.25 −0.46 0.32 1.00
Log Openness 0.34 −0.05 −0.19 −0.22 0.14 0.25
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Figure 1. Relationships between main variables.
tion between the two (−0.57). Previous studies have con-
sidered the association between corruption experiences
and perceptions. Treisman (2007) demonstrates that,
controlling for national income, many factors that pre-
dict perceptions of corruption do not predict experience-
based metrics. Gillanders and Parviainen (2018) show
that perceptions, not experiences, predict foreign direct
investment inflows. In the context of our study, the lack
of a very strong correlation suggests that factors such as
press freedom could influence perceptions of corruption
more, or indeed less, than the reality of corruption.
As an alternative to the bribery index, in some spec-
ifications we include the percentage of firms who view
corruption to be a major constraint in terms of their cur-
rent operations. While this is a measure of perceptions
in a sense, it is measuring the perceptions of people di-
rectly affected by corruption. It also has the advantage
of allowing for additional modalities of corruption as it
does not simply ask about bribery.
Our approach is to follow Brunetti and Weder (2003)
and estimate simple regression models in which corrup-
tion perceptions are explained by press freedom. While
we do have some countries with repeated observations
of the bribery index, there is little time variation within
press freedom. Indeed, the correlation between press
freedom and its 10th lag is 0.95. Therefore, our key inno-
vation is to control for objectively measured corruption
in order to examine if press freedom is associated with
perceptions of corruption holding the reality of corrup-
tion constant. Our basic regression of interest is:
Corruption Perceptions Indexi =
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1PFi + 𝛽2EXPi + 𝛽xXi + 𝜀i
where Corruption Perceptions Indexi is the corruption
score given to country i by Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index; PFi is the level of press
freedom of country i; EXPi is the country’s experience of
corruption; Xi represents the control variables; and 𝜀i is
an error term of the usual type.
Our control variables include factors that are com-
monly included as controls in regressions seeking to ex-
plain corruption, namely the level of democracy as mea-
sured by the Polity IV database and GDP per capita
from the World Development Indicators. In addition, we
use openness to international trade, measured as ex-
ports plus imports divided GDP, also from the World
Development Indicators. Each of these could plausibly in-
fluence press freedom and both corruption perceptions
and experiences. Triesman (2000) argues that democracy
increases the risk of acting corruptly, in part through free-
dom of the press. Chowdhury (2004) finds that democ-
racy predicts less corruption, holding press freedom con-
stant. Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013) present evidence
that press freedom and democracy are complimentary
with both needed to reduce corruption. Gundlach and
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Paldam (2009) provide evidence that economic develop-
ment causes less corruption. In our tests that replicate
Brunetti and Weder’s (2003) basic specification, we con-
trol for openness to international trade as a measure of
competition (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Triesman, 2007).
4. Results
4.1. Press Freedom and Corruption Perceptions
Before testing for a reputational premiumwe corroborate
Brunetti and Weder’s (2003) original finding using con-
temporary data. We employ the Corruption Perceptions
Index as our main measure of corruption perceptions as
opposed to the International Country Risk Guide. Brunetti
and Weder (2003) show that their results are robust to
using the Corruption Perceptions Index. Table 3 presents
these estimates. Column 1 shows pooled estimates from
2012–2016, adjusting for the level of democracy, GDP per
capita, and openness to international trade. All of these
variables are statistically significant predictors of corrup-
tion perceptions, as is press freedom. Column 2 adds year
fixed effects and shows that nothing changes in terms
of statistical significance or the magnitude of the coef-
ficients. As already noted, there is very little variation
in press freedom over time. Nevertheless, for complete-
ness, column 3 reports estimates from fixed effects re-
gressions to account for long-term historical factors and
trends.While the sign of the coefficient on press freedom
is in the expected direction it is not statistically signifi-
cant. This is in line with Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013)
who emphasize the lack of within country variation in
such data. While the assumption for random effects may
not be valid as the country specific effect is plausibly
correlated with the independent variables, we nonethe-
less follow the literature and present results using ran-
dom effects (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Chowdhury, 2004;
Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013). As shown by Papyrakis,
Rieger, and Gilberthorpe (2017), there is some trade-off
for variables that are ‘sluggish’ (i.e., they do not vary con-
siderably over-time). In such instances the fixed effects re-
gression model can be highly susceptible to type II errors
and random effects estimators’ absolute bias may even
be smaller. Column 4 presents these results which again
point to a significant association between press freedom
and corruption perceptions. These models, which corrob-
orate Brunetti and Weder (2003), are based on 668 ob-
servations from 2012–2016, while our later results which
control for corruption experiences are based on a smaller
sample of 76 observations from 2012–2016. There are
fewer observations in the latter sample due to the more
periodic nature of the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.
Table 3. Corruption perceptions and press freedom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Variable OLS OLS FE RE OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Press −0.50*** −0.50*** −0.07 −0.19*** −0.50*** −0.49*** −0.51*** −0.49*** −0.50*** −0.40***
Freedom (0.031) (0.031) (0.052) (0.049) (0.071) (0.067) (0.068) (0.073) (0.068) (0.033)
Democracy −0.60*** −0.60*** −0.07 −0.08 −0.61** −0.65*** −0.66*** −0.53** −0.57*** −0.41***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.178) (0.147) (0.260) (0.221) (0.207) (0.217) (0.201) (0.096)
Ln(GDP per 6.74*** 6.73*** 6.15** 8.45*** 6.66*** 7.34*** 6.90*** 6.46*** 6.30*** 6.74***
capita) (0.304) (0.305) (2.355) (0.703) (0.732) (0.648) (0.624) (0.710) (0.717) (0.457)
Ln(Openness) 2.36*** 2.36*** −1.51 −0.16 2.25 2.70 2.69 2.34 1.83 2.05**
(0.814) (0.817) (1.627) (1.440) (1.667) (1.737) (1.765) (2.011) (2.087) (0.811)
OECD 5.73***
(1.396)
sub-Saharan 3.08***
Africa (1.113)
Latin America −4.29***
& Caribbean (1.108)
Constant 13.93*** 13.74*** −4.98 −19.07*** 15.11* 8.99 13.62* 15.18* 17.44** 6.37
(3.781) (3.821) (21.207) (7.314) (9.072) (8.221) (7.856) (8.856) (8.606) (4.958)
Year fixed No Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes
effects
Restricted No No No No 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 No
sample
Observations 668 668 668 668 121 133 137 139 138 668
R-squared 0.762 0.762 0.667 0.718 0.789 0.779 0.775 0.740 0.735 0.784
Notes: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares; FE = Fixed Effects; RE = Random Effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 103–115 108
While Transparency International changed their
methodology in 2012, and argue that one can meaning-
fully compare data over time thereafter, the fact that
data sources for the Corruption Perceptions Index can
change from year to year is a concern, particularly given
that our main results are based on a sample in which
we have observations from different countries in differ-
ent years. It is reassuring, therefore, that our findings
hold in separate tests where the sample is limited to
a single year from the period 2012–2016. These tests,
displayed in columns 5 to 9, show that the results are
consistent in terms of statistical significance and mag-
nitude. Finally, in Column 10, we emulate Brunetti and
Weder (2003) and include dummies for the OECD, Latin
American and Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa to al-
low for unobserved heterogeneity between these groups
(and the rest of the world as the omitted category). Our
findings are robust to this modification, and Column 10
serves as our baseline model to which we will now add
corruption experiences.
4.2. The Reputational Premium Hypothesis
Table 4 presents our results which adjust for corruption
experiences using World Bank’s Enterprise Survey data.
As these are not carried out in each country each year,
we have a smaller sample when the corresponding vari-
able is included in our tests. Column 1 shows that press
freedom is nonetheless associated with corruption per-
ceptions in this smaller sample. Column 2 presents our
main finding. It shows that after controlling for the inci-
dence of bribery in public transactions, which is a signif-
icant predictor of corruption perceptions in our sample,
press freedom remains a significant predictor of corrup-
tion perceptions. Moreover, the estimated coefficient
only falls slightly relative to column 1. In terms of the
substantive relationship, the findings indicate that a one-
point increase in press freedom improves corruption per-
ceptions by 0.27 of a unit on the Corruption Perceptions
Index. As we already mentioned above, both of these
scales run from 0–100. Themagnitude of this association
is similar (0.24) when the bribery index is included in col-
umn 2. Here, a 1% improvement in the bribery index is
associated with a 0.22 improvement in the Corruption
Perceptions Index.
Column 3 reaches the same conclusion, presenting
estimates using an alternative objective measure of cor-
ruption, the percentage of firms who report that cor-
ruption is an impediment to their operations. Column 4
includes both of these variables in the same model,
and shows that press freedom remains statistically sig-
nificant. The remaining columns repeat this analysis us-
ing alternative measures of press freedom. Column 5
uses Freedom House’s categorization of press freedom
as ‘Free,’ ‘Partly free,’ and ‘Not free’ instead of the con-
tinuous measure. Controlling for corruption experiences,
Table 4. Inclusion of corruption experiences.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Press freedom −0.27*** −0.24*** −0.26*** −0.25***
(0.070) (0.074) (0.064) (0.069)
Press freedom −0.08** −0.09*** −0.07**
(Reporters Without (0.032) (0.029) (0.030)
Borders Rank)
Not free −9.42***
(3.070)
Partly free −6.62**
(2.650)
Bribery index −0.22*** −0.16** −0.16** −0.20*** −0.14*
(0.070) (0.073) (0.076) (0.070) (0.077)
Obstacle −0.45** −0.33* −0.26 −0.40** −0.29
(0.176) (0.177) (0.186) (0.172) (0.180)
Democracy 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.60*** 0.42** 0.47** 0.49**
(0.182) (0.187) (0.218) (0.216) (0.179) (0.165) (0.191) (0.188)
Ln(GDP per capita) 5.21*** 3.41*** 4.65*** 3.53*** 3.90*** 3.30*** 4.43*** 3.46***
(1.032) (1.177) (0.826) (1.118) (1.155) (1.133) (0.897) (1.083)
Ln(Openness) 2.96* 3.66** 2.41 3.06** 3.12* 2.03 0.74 1.58
(1.502) (1.411) (1.583) (1.477) (1.576) (1.573) (1.649) (1.589)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 75 75 75
R-squared 0.770 0.799 0.799 0.812 0.795 0.782 0.782 0.793
Notes: Constant and regional dummies not displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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countries classified as ‘Partly free’ and ‘Not free’ are per-
ceived to be more corrupt. Columns 6 to 8 present esti-
mateswhich include ameasure of press freedomcreated
by Reporters Without Borders, and are in line with our
findings using the Freedom House data.
Overall, the findings suggest that a free press is good
news for a country’s reputation, as it drives corruption
perceptions above and beyond any effect it has on the
reality of corruption. This has important consequences
because previous studies show that a country’s corrup-
tion rank is linked to important social and economic indi-
cators such as interpersonal trust (Banerjee et al., 2015;
Seligson, 2002; Uslaner, 2004) and foreign direct invest-
ment (Gillanders&Parviainen, 2018;Wei, 2000). The rep-
utational premium we find is further evidence of the im-
portance of a vibrant public space for the exchange of
information and ideas.
4.3. Reputational Gains and the Level of Corruption
We now consider which countries stand to gain this rep-
utational premium. One possibility is that countries only
gain if they are relatively corruption free. Countries with
little actual corruption may not earn a premium because
they have already achieved a top reputation, which acts
as a ceiling. Alternatively, very corrupt countries may
not benefit much from marginal improvements in press
freedom, as their poor reputation acts as a floor in cor-
ruption ranking exercises. Interestingly, a previous study
(Ahrend, 2002) finds that education only reduces cor-
ruption where there is press freedom. If a state signals
change and initiates the process of liberalization, this
might be seen as a signal to corruption experts that the
state should get credit from initiating the process of press
liberalization. Across these scenarios, experts may over-
react or underreact to a state’s existing reputation or
the signals that it sends about its future path or direc-
tion. To test these possibilities, we estimate models in-
cluding interaction terms between press freedom and
the experience-based measures of corruption. Table 5
presents the results. The interaction term in column 1
is statistically significant when we use the bribery inci-
dence variable and is not significant when we use the ob-
stacle variable in its place (column 2). The positive sign
Table 5. Interacting experienced corruption with press freedom.
Variables (1) (2)
Press freedom −0.38*** −0.35***
(0.105) (0.098)
Bribery index −0.85**
(0.331)
Press freedom*Bribery index 0.01**
(0.005)
Obstacle −1.10**
(0.513)
Press freedom*Obstacle 0.01
(0.008)
Democracy 0.16 0.18
(0.189) (0.218)
Ln(GDP per capita) 3.15*** 4.40***
(1.097) (0.861)
Ln(Openness) 2.51* 2.38
(1.478) (1.630)
OECD 2.08 3.07
(3.735) (3.079)
sub-Saharan Africa −0.71 −0.45
(2.414) (2.623)
Latin America & Caribbean −10.92*** −7.42**
(2.823) (2.956)
Constant 31.29** 19.06*
(12.896) (11.239)
Year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 76 76
R-squared 0.811 0.805
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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on this interaction term in column 1 suggests that press
freedom is less effective at promoting a good reputation
in contexts with more experienced corruption.
To investigate further, the top-left panel of Figure 2
plots the marginal effect of press freedom on corrup-
tion perceptions by level of experienced corruption. It
shows that the marginal effect of improvements in press
freedom declines as the reality of corruption increases
but remains statistically significant until around 20 on
the bribery index. As we have seen, this level on the in-
dex means that 20% of the transactions in which firms
sought utilities’ connections or engagedwith tax and reg-
ulatory authorities featured bribery requests or expecta-
tions. The remaining panels of Figure 2 (top-right and bot-
tom) plot the distribution of the bribery index (in 5%bins)
and show that the majority of countries in our sample
and in a broader sample not limited to post 2012 obser-
vations fall below this threshold. Therefore, the reputa-
tional benefits of a free press are not limited to low cor-
ruption countries, though such countries do stand to gain
the most frommarginal improvements in press freedom.
4.4. Robustness Checks
Indices such as the Corruption Perceptions Index are de-
signed to reflect perceptions of both grand and petty
corruption. However, some may regard firm-level experi-
ences of bribery as petty corruption, thoughmany of the
contexts would involve large sums (tax and construction)
or occur only once or rarely (for example, in obtaining li-
censes, permits, and utility connections). To address this
concern, we use a proxy for grand corruption—the per-
centage of firms who express the view that corruption in
public procurement is necessary. Corruption in govern-
ment procurement is generally regarded as one of the
main modalities of grand corruption, which lends sup-
port to our decision to use this proxy (David-Barrett &
Fazekas, 2019). This proxy, which also comes from the
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, is based on a question
where firm owners andmanagers are asked if other firms
with the same characteristics as their own are expected
to pay bribes in order to secure government contracts.
The assumption here is that firms draw on their own ex-
perience when asked about ‘firms like this one’ or that
they are sufficiently well informed or experienced about
the workings of procurement processes in their industry
to make an accurate determination.
Table 6 presents the results. When our proxy for
grand corruption is included, we still find a statistically
significant association between press freedom and cor-
ruption perceptions. Interestingly, procurement corrup-
tion does not have a statistically significant relationship
with perceptions of corruption, perhaps reflecting the
difficulty for such grand corruption to be observed by ex-
ternal experts and agencies until it is exposed. These re-
sults support our contention that there is a reputational
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Figure 2.Marginal effect of press freedom by level of experienced corruption.
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Table 6. Controlling for proxy for grand corruption.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Press freedom −0.27*** −0.25*** −0.26***
(0.070) (0.074) (0.065)
Bribery index −0.20***
(0.062)
Obstacle −0.41**
(0.164)
Procurement corruption index −0.08 −0.03 −0.04
(0.049) (0.042) (0.044)
Democracy 0.11 0.16 0.21
(0.192) (0.193) (0.221)
Ln(GDP p.c.) 4.35*** 3.23** 4.26***
(1.137) (1.222) (0.985)
Ln(Openness) 2.70* 3.47** 2.33
(1.566) (1.461) (1.600)
OECD 6.51** 5.78* 4.44
(2.976) (3.072) (2.945)
sub-Saharan Africa 0.74 −0.60 −0.28
(2.663) (2.533) (2.421)
Latin America & Caribbean −9.31*** −10.42*** −8.64***
(3.211) (3.010) (3.028)
Constant 14.72 23.99* 16.46
(12.770) (13.148) (10.952)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 76 76 76
R-squared 0.781 0.801 0.802
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
bounty from a free press on top of any effect on actual
corruption levels.
Finally, Table 7 presents the results from running our
mainmodelswith theWorld Bank’s Control of Corruption
index as our measure of corruption perceptions. This in-
dicator ranges from −2.5 to 2.5, with larger numbers
denoting less corruption. As noted above, this metric
contains some sources that are based on experiences
rather than expert assessments. Nevertheless, it is highly
correlated with the Corruption Perceptions Index in our
sample (0.98). Using this metric of corruption percep-
tions does allow us to expand our sample consider-
ably as the control of corruption methodology has not
changed as dramatically as the Corruption Perceptions
Indexmethodology has, though the authors do note that
changes in score can reflect changes in sources or weight-
ing (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). Columns 1 to
3 of Table 7 shows that our conclusion regarding the rep-
utational benefit of a free press is robust to this change
in dependent variable, with the only substantial differ-
ence being that procurement corruption is associated
with perceptions of corruption in this larger sample.
5. Conclusions
In this article, we explore whether cross-country corrup-
tion perception indices based on expert assessments re-
ward states with a freer press more than one might ex-
pect given levels of experienced corruption.We find that
press freedom improves a country’s reputation, creating
a reputational premium. In other words, whilst a free
press may reduce corrupt behavior directly, we find that
it also reduces corruption perceptions, irrespective of
actual corruption levels. In particular, we find that the
developed world is the main beneficiary of this reputa-
tional premium, as it is strongest in countries with low
to moderate levels of corruption by global standards.
These findings are robust to several concerns regarding
corruption measurement. One concern is that our mea-
sure of corruption experiences is biased toward petty cor-
ruption because it is compiled from firm-level surveys.
To address this concern, we repeated our tests using
a proxy for grand corruption. We also used alternative
measures of press freedom, corruption perceptions, and
corruption experiences. Our findings using these alterna-
tive measures and proxy variable were in line with our
main results.
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Table 7. Robustness: Key results using World Bank’s Control of Corruption index.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Press freedom −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.01***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Bribery index −0.01*** −0.01***
(0.003) (0.003)
Procurement corruption index −0.01***
(0.002)
Democracy −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.22*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
Ln(Openness) 0.02 0.06 0.03
(0.068) (0.064) (0.067)
OECD 0.31** 0.29** 0.30**
(0.141) (0.136) (0.130)
sub-Saharan Africa 0.11 −0.00 0.01
(0.093) (0.091) (0.091)
Latin America & Caribbean −0.21 −0.42*** −0.45***
(0.145) (0.145) (0.143)
Constant −1.01** −0.10 −0.04
(0.395) (0.413) (0.426)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 193 193 190
R-squared 0.610 0.671 0.688
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Overall, our findings suggest that press freedom has
important consequences for a country’s standing in inter-
national corruption indicators. Previous research shows
that these indicators, though they have limitations and
may not always capture reality, have real consequences
for national wellbeing in terms of attracting foreign di-
rect investment and other important social and eco-
nomic outcomes. Therefore, policy makers should de-
vote considerable efforts and resources to protecting
press freedom where it already exists. Even in countries
with a long and venerable tradition of press freedom,
more can be done to enshrine its practice in legislation,
support the social norms that allow it to function effec-
tively, ensure diversity in the ownership of the media,
and strengthen citizens’ capacity to act on the informa-
tion provided by a free press.
Finally, our work contributes to a growing literature
which has established a robust and direct link between
press freedom and corruption outcomes (Adsera et al.,
2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Freille et al., 2007). In
recent years, this literature has expanded to consider
a range of corruption and anti-corruption efforts be-
yond a singular focus on expert perceptions. Binhadab
et al. (2018), for example, consider corruption in busi-
ness and Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov (2017) consider
the role of press freedom in ensuring the effectiveness
of anticorruption laws and tools in different contexts.
A promising new line of future research is to compare
and contrast multiple corruption indicators and the ex-
tent to which they are interrelated, as Adhikari, Breen,
and Gillanders (2019) do with firms’ and experts’ percep-
tions and Flavin andMontgomery (2019) dowith citizens’
and experts’ perceptions.
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